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Abstract: After a merger, company officials face the challenge of making compensation 
schemes uniform and of redesigning teams with managers from companies with different 
incentives, work habits and recruiting methods. In this paper, we investigate the 
relationship between executive pay and performance after a merger by dissociating the 
respective influence of shifts, which occur in both compensation incentives and team 
composition. The results of a real task experiment conducted with managers within a large 
pharmaceutical company not only show that changes in compensation incentives affect 
performance but also suggest that the sorting effect of incentives in the previous companies 
impact cooperation and efficiency after the merger. Replicating this experiment with 
students showed differences in strategy rather than in substance between the two groups of 
subjects with managers appearing performance driven while students are more cost driven. 
 
JEL-Code: C81, C92, J33, M52 
Keywords: Executive and team-based compensation, subject pool effects, real task 
experiment,  incentives,   sorting,  mergers. 
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1. Introduction 
There is strong evidence of the existence of heterogeneity among the compensation 
packages applied by firms within the same industry. It is not surprising to find that after a 
merger, difficulties can arise because of the different compensation policies of the newly 
merged firms and that new consolidated policies need to be designed. Furthermore, 
downsizing and the reorganization of production entail a reshuffling of teams, which affect 
executives from the companies involved in the merger. In order to promote social cohesion, 
mergers usually lead to the harmonization of company statutes so that all executives are 
paid according to the same compensation schemes. But within new teams comprised of 
executives of the merged companies, performance also depends on the willingness of 
individuals to cooperate with others. This willingness to cooperate may be affected by the 
heterogeneity of past compensation practices, work habits and non-market interactions. 
Many pitfalls can hamper an empirical analysis of the relationship between new executive 
pay packages and executive performance after a merger. The impact of new compensation 
packages may differ from one employee to another depending on the short, medium and 
long-term influence of preceding modes of compensation (see Nalbantian and Schotter, 
1997). Thus, assessing the impact of new compensation schemes on executive performance 
after a merger requires controlling for the possibility of the long-term impacts of the 
compensation packages used before the merger. Furthermore, unbiased estimates of the 
relationship between pay and performance require disentangling the effects of shifts in 
direct incentives from the effects of the emergence of a new group culture founded on a 
variety of previous corporate cultures (Kreps, 1990). Individuals coming from a variety of 
previous cultures, with different norms of fairness and social comparison, could be 
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expected to behave differently in the new company. Previous cultures can affect the 
efficiency of a new unified compensation policy particularly in the short run. Experimental 
methods can help in circumventing part of these difficulties through the comparison of 
various treatments in a controlled environment. This point has been successfully made in 
the context of a merger by Weber and Camerer (2003) who show that performance 
decreases following the merger of two laboratory firms because of failure in coordination.  
In this paper, we design an experiment to analyze the relationship between executive 
compensation schemes and performance after a merger. Our laboratory experiment was 
conducted with 36 managers of a large pharmaceutical company created by the recent 
merger of two companies, one French and one German. It was replicated with 72 students 
in Lyon and Montreal. Thus, our paper also contributes to the literature on subject pool 
effects by comparing decisions made by student-subjects and manager-subjects. Studies by 
Dyer, Kagel and Levin (1989), and Carpenter, Burks and Verhoogen (2003) have 
underlined differences (risk attitudes, fairness) and similarities (winner’s curse) across 
subject pools. Hannan, Kagel and Moser (2002) show that MBA effort levels are greater 
than those of undergraduate students and Fehr and List (2002) observe that CEO’s exhibit 
more trustful behavior. How can one explain that in some games expertise seems to 
influence behavior whereas in others it has no significant influence? Cooper, Kagel, Lo and 
Gu (1999) emphasize the relationship between context and expertise. Expertise can 
improve the relative efficiency of manager-subjects in experiments only when they are able 
to recognize the similarity between the laboratory context and their field experience. Here, 
we could expect that conducting the experiment within the company context and 
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performing an abstract task which reproduces characteristics of executive teamwork, should 
induce a greater level of performance from managers. Our paper is also innovative since it 
examines these effects in a team context with individual and team rewards. 
The task required of participants consisted of searching for the highest value of a multiple-
peaked function in a two-dimensional space. This task has a cognitive component since 
intense concentration is required because of uncertainty and time pressure and there is a 
monetary cost linked to the chosen speed of progression. This real-task experiment adds to 
the limited number of experimental papers (Dickinson, 1999, Sillamaa, 1999, van Dijk, 
Sonnemans and van Winden, 2001, Falk and Ichino, 2003, Gneezy, Niederle and 
Rustichini, 2003), which study rewards and behavior in a real work setting. Many 
experiments, which require subjects to choose an effort level not related to a real effort 
confirm that monetary incentives do matter, but assume the equivalence between intention 
of contribution and effort, and between disutility of effort and money. Our experiment also 
differs from naturally occurring experiments (for example, Lazear, 2000) or field 
experiments (Erev, Bornstein and Galili, 1993) in which subjects perform a task in a real 
work environment. In our study, manager-subjects undertake tasks, which reproduce 
aspects of a manager’s job under a familiar structure of incentives. They make their 
decisions in an artificial environment of anonymous interactions, according to instructions 
using neutral wording and without field referents. 
Our design involves two parts: in the first part, teams are homogeneous and are paid 
according to the rules in effect before the merger of the pharmaceutical firms. In the second 
part, the teams remain homogenous or are formed randomly with participants originating 
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from each of the two merged companies or from both schools; all are paid according to the 
rules in use after the merger. These treatments are aimed at disentangling the effect of the 
shift in team composition and the impact of the shift in incentive schemes.  
Our main results indicate that there is a pure effect on performance of the shift in incentives 
after the merger. They show that the past matters in as much as some managers reduce their 
effort when they are potentially mixed with managers from the other incoming firm. This 
may be the result of sorting effect of previous incentives schemes: paying executives under 
different rules has probably contributed to the creation of attitudes towards cooperation in 
teams. Lastly, we find evidence that manager-subjects and student-subjects differ more in 
strategy than in substance, with managers being oriented more to the maximization of 
performance while students focus more on cost minimization. 
In Section 2, the design of the experiment is outlined. Section 3 presents the experimental 
procedures. The empirical results are discussed in Section 4. In section 5, we conclude. 
2. Experimental Design  
The experiment consists of two parts. It reconstitutes in the first part the pay structure of the 
firms before they merge and in the second part, the pay structure prevailing in the merger. 
The nature of the task to be performed during the experiment remains the same, thus 
allowing an analysis of the consequences on performance of both changes in the payment 
structure and of team composition. In this section, we present the design of the task, the 
structure of payment schemes, the treatments and information conditions. 
2.1. Task design and behavioral heuristics  
One original aspect of this experiment lies in the design of a task, which mimics some 
aspects of the content of a manager’s job (concentration, variability, adjustment of means to 
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targets and ability to cope with uncertainty under time pressure). The challenge was to be 
able to discriminate the impact of a cognitive effort on the outcome from that of ability. 
The task consists in searching for the highest value of an increasing function built in a two-
dimensional space defined vertically by height (H) and horizontally by distance (D) from 
the origin, with [ ]0,100H ∈ , [ ]0,300D∈  and with ( )MaxH f= D . It is common knowledge 
that the curve can have single or multiple peaks. When the period starts, the box in which 
the curve will appear is fully black. During a one-minute period, the subject progressively 
uncovers the curve on his computer screen starting at the origin, by clicking a button.
i
 The 
subject progresses by discrete steps on the horizontal axis. She can stop her progression at 
any moment. The outcome achieved by a subject in a period is given by the maximum 
height reached on the curve, which depends notably on the number of moves. 
The monetary cost associated with the task is represented by the choice of the speed of 
progression, i.e. the work pace. Two buttons are available to the subjects: a “1-step button” 
used to uncover the curves at a regular speed and is cost free; a “2-step button” that doubles 
the speed but which costs 0.4 point. The subject can switch speeds at will. This design 
allows a control over the subject’s tasks cost and makes possible an analysis of efficiency. 
It is impossible to reach maximum height during the one-minute period allowed by using 
the regular speed only, with the exception of one of the 13 randomly occurring curves. The 
subjects do not know this information. A subject's outcome depends on the use of two-step 
moves and on chance since there is uncertainty about the distances from the origins to the 
peaks. Therefore, the cognitive dimension of the task relates to the uncertainty about the 
shape of the curve, to time pressure and to the decision to use the 1-step or 2-step button.  
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Unlike van Dijk, Sonnemans and van Winden's (2001) real-task experiment, ours involves 
no algorithm enabling the discovery of a peak at minimum cost while under time 
constrains; no one benefits from previous learning. At each point on the curve, the subject 
cannot infer from the already uncovered part of the curve the slope of the curve at the next 
point. The subject cannot discover one single algorithm but must build heuristic grounded 
on a continuous trade-off between the speed to choose and the time left. For example, if a 
subject has already used many extra cost moves and the curve remains flat, paying each 
additional 2-step move requires a continuous trade-off between its marginal cost and its 
expected marginal revenue. Compared to a traditional experiment where effort values are 
chosen from a payoff table with a unique trade-off between cost and outcome, our task 
involves an unknown optimal way of reaching the maximum height at a minimum cost 
since subjects do not know the locations of peaks. The property of duality is not checked: 
the minimization of cost does not correspond to the maximization of the objective. The 
multiplicity of heuristics and uncertainty concerning the location of peaks prevent any 
theoretical prediction. 
ii
In short, there are two aspects to the task chosen in this experiment: the decision to use the 
costless or costly way to progress and the speed of progression, where both can be 
measured. However, the cognitive problem of how to reach a higher altitude cannot be 
measured. For the rest of the paper, the altitude reached is the observable outcome of the 
cognitive effort. This output and the cost of progression are the variables to be explained. 
2.2. Payment schemes 
Another point of originality lies in the design of compensation schemes that combine fixed 
pay and performance-pay, the latter involving both individual and team incentives. The 
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game involves teams consisting of three subjects who have to uncover the same curve. 
Subjects are not allowed to communicate with teammates and are not informed of their 
simultaneous progression. Individual earnings from a task in a given period are calculated 
from the sum of three elements whose amount and relative proportion depend on the stage 
of the game and on the treatment. Specifically, earnings are defined as: i F I Tα α α απ = + + , 
with { },X Yα = . X and Y correspond to the two firms before they merge, and for simplicity 
X and Y subjects keep their respective labels after the merger in order to track their origin. 
Fα is a fixed-wage earned by subject i when her individual outcome reaches a first 
threshold, , defined by the height reached. This threshold can always be achieved with 
no cost steps in the time allowed, but this information is not given to subjects. An employer 
would consider a distance achieved below this benchmark as professional misconduct. 
min
1H
Iα  is 
an individual bonus earned if i’s outcome reaches a second threshold,  with 
. 
min
2H
min min
2 1H H> Tα  is a team reward obtained when the sum of individual outcomes by the 
team of 3 subjects reaches a third threshold  with . A subject 
may earn this reward even though she does not reach an output level greater than the level 
giving her the fixed wage or the individual bonus. This creates an incentive to free ride.  
min
3H
min min min
3 23 3H H H> > 1
At each repetition of the game, a new curve is randomly drawn, whose shape determines 
the extent of uncertainty faced by the subjects. The analysis of performance and costs must 
control for the degree of difficulty of the curves. Because of the structure of the 
compensation package, the difficulty of a curve depends on the location of the various 
thresholds. An index of difficulty is calculated as : d = (D1)2 + (D2 – D1)2 + (D3 – D2) with 
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D1 being the abscissa at the origin of the first threshold, D2 the abscissa of the second 
threshold and D3 the abscissa of the maximum height. The more distant the first threshold is 
from the origin and the greater the distance between the first and the second thresholds, the 
more difficult it becomes to reach additional rewards. 
2.3. Experimental treatments and information conditions 
The experiment aims at identifying the separate influences of changes in incentives and in 
team composition. To measure the impact of changes in payment schemes, a session was 
designed having two parts of 10 periods each, with a random order of presentation of 13 
payoff curves. In the first part, used as a benchmark, we reproduce initial payment schemes 
that were used before the merger; in the second part the payment scheme in use after the 
merger is applied. In the first part, we team X and Y subjects separately, each playing under 
the payment scheme used in their initial company. Members of X teams may receive a 
fixed wage, an individual bonus and a team reward. Earnings for members of Y teams are 
derived from a fixed wage and a team reward only (see Table 1). The proportion of 
potential total earnings from the fixed wage is higher for Y subjects than for X subjects, but 
the same performance is required from all subjects to trigger their fixed payment and team 
reward. In the second part of the session, the payment scheme is the one used after the 
merger and is the same for all subjects. It includes a fixed wage, an individual bonus and a 
team reward. Compared to the first part, Y subjects may now receive an individual bonus 
and X subjects have seen an increase in their fixed wage. In avoiding a decrease in the 
absolute level of any pay component of earnings between the two parts of the session, the 
maximum earnings all subjects can obtain is now 120 ECU instead of 100.  
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To measure the impact of team composition on performance, a new matching treatment was 
introduced in two sessions. This treatment is referred as the mixed-treatment, where teams 
of 3 randomly associated subjects are formed potentially involving both X and Y subjects. 
The fixed-treatment used in the first part of all sessions, where X and Y subjects are teamed 
exclusively with X and Y subjects, respectively, is maintained in the second part in one 
session. The fixed-treatment serves as a benchmark against which the effect of team 
composition after the merger is tested. A stranger matching protocol is always used. In the 
second part of the session, only team composition is changed and not the size of the 
teams.
iii
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
All subjects, except those playing the fixed treatment, knew of the existence of two 
categories of subjects in equal numbers in the room, but they were kept unaware of the 
meaning of labels X and Y. Subjects learned their own identity by reading the instruction 
sheet and were notified that they would keep the same identity throughout the session. The 
instruction sheet for the first 10 periods mentioned that they were matched with two other 
subjects belonging to the same category as themselves and that the composition of groups 
would within the same category change with each new period. They were informed that 
they would never know the identity and the payoff of their successive teammates. Subjects 
knew the description of the task to be performed and the payoff structure applicable to their 
category. The participants were not given information about the payoff structure of the 
other category of subjects; were aware that the same task was to be achieved by the three 
members of their group and had no current information about the progression of their 
teammates on the curve. During play, their screen indicates the time currently left, the 
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cumulated cost of their 2-step decisions and the height of the different thresholds reached. 
At the end of each period, a historic table gave each subject feedback on their own 
outcome, the outcome (cumulative height) achieved by their team, total cost, amount of 
compensation obtained, by source, and total payoff net of costs.  
In the second part of the session, subjects were informed about the payoff structure of the 
first part for each of the two categories. The new payoff structure common to all subjects 
was explained. In one session, an equal number of subjects from both categories continued 
to play under the fixed treatment for periods 11 to 20. In two sessions, subjects drawn in 
equal numbers from X and Y were informed that during the remaining 10 periods they 
could be matched randomly with members of the other category.
iv
3. Experimental Procedures 
The experiment was first conducted with managers of the pharmaceutical company about 
two years after the merger and it was later replicated with students in engineering and 
business from Lyon and Montreal. 
36 volunteer executives were recruited by email with average annual earnings of 69,000 
euros, consisting of 18 managers from each incoming firm. To limit uncontrolled peer 
group effects, sessions were designed such that the participants represented a large diversity 
of departments and came from different geographical locations.
v
 The experiment was 
conducted at the company headquarter in Paris on the same day to limit the dissemination 
of information. In the first two sessions, 12 participants (6X, 6Y) were subjected to the 
mixed-treatment protocol. In a third session, 12 participants played under the fixed-
treatment protocol. On average, a session lasted 75 minutes including practice periods. 
Transactions were conducted in Experimental Currency Units, with ECU convertible to 
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Euros at the rate 150 ECU = 4.5 €. A show-up fee of 8 € was added. On average, a subject 
earned 51.45 € (S.D.=3.75). Subjects were paid a few days later with vouchers. 
Upon arrival, each manager had to register and was invited to draw a ticket from an 
envelope to assign him or her a computer. In fact, company specific envelopes were 
presented to subjects according to their originating company, but subjects were unaware of 
this allocation rule. Subjects discovered a set of written instructions for the first part of the 
session under their keyboard. As the payment schemes differed among X and Y 
participants, the experimenter did not read the instructions aloud.
vi Instructions were 
phrased in neutral terms with queries answered in private. Three practice rounds were run 
before the experiment began. At the end of the first part, the game stopped and further 
instructions for the second part were distributed, without any questions allowed.  
This experiment was replicated with 72 student subjects, in the experimental laboratories of 
GATE-Lyon and at the LUBC3E-CIRANO in Montreal. Three sessions were organized 
over two days. The two mixed-treatment sessions were played on-line, the REGATE 
software enabling the on-line reshuffling of groups between Montreal and Lyon subjects. 
During each mixed-treatment session, 12 French subjects and 12 Canadian subjects 
interacted as subjects X and Y without being informed that they were playing with subjects 
abroad. The third session (fixed-treatment) involved 12 students at each location. Sessions 
were conducted under the same conditions as sessions with manager-subjects, except that 
the ECU were convertible at the rate 150 ECU = 1 Euro for the French subjects and at the 
rate 150 ECU = 1.5 Canadian Dollars for the Canadian subjects. A show-up fee of 4 Euros 
or 6 Canadian Dollars was added. On average, a subject earned 12.89 € (S.D.=0.80 €). 
Subjects were immediately paid in cash in a separate room. 
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4. Experimental results  
4.1. Overall statistics 
In Figures 1 to 3, we present histograms of average output achieved, average rate of free-
riders and average return to output level plotted against treatment, subject pool and the 
group of periods (1-10 or 11-20). Figure 1 shows that the reaction to incentives differs 
according to the subject pools: the average output level is higher for managers than for 
students throughout the experiment. For the managers, output increases in the second part 
of the experiment under the merged company's compensation package. This increase is 
particularly noticeable in the fixed treatment sessions, where the only change introduced 
relates to the increase in monetary incentives; when both incentives and team composition 
are changed, the increase in managers' average output is not significant. 
[Insert Figures 1, 2, and 3 about here] 
These different output levels may be related to differences in the proportion of free riders in 
the two pools. Because of the team reward in the payment scheme, our experiment can be 
connected with the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism in public good games. It is 
interesting to verify whether the co-existence of a fixed wage, an individual bonus and a 
team reward in the same compensation scheme changes the behavior towards cooperation 
as typically observed in these games. Transposing the strict definition of free riding in the 
VCM to our experiment means that a free rider is here defined in the following way. In part 
1, X is qualified as a free rider in period t when her output is 60≤ , i.e. when the subject 
does not contribute to the team outcome beyond the level that triggers her individual bonus. 
The same condition applies for part 2. In part 1, Y is qualified as a free-rider when her 
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output in period t is , i.e. when she does not contribute to the team outcome beyond 
the level that secures her fixed wage, and in part 2 when her output level is . In a 
typical public good game, whereas each subject has a dominant strategy not to contribute, 
the level of contribution is initially positive and declines with repetition (see Ledyard, 
1995). Figure 2 shows the rate of free riders by subject-pool and by treatment for parts 1 
and 2. It indicates that there is a low proportion of free-riders compared to traditional 
results of public good games, probably because of both the coexistence of individual and 
collective payments and the impossibility of calculating the marginal per capita return of 
investing in the team outcome.
40≤
60≤
vii
 The proportion of free riders is lower among managers 
than among students in both parts.
viii 
 This proportion is lower when the threshold that 
triggers the greater individual reward is low. It increases in part 2 in both subject pools, 
particularly in the mixed sessions, and this cannot be explained by a restart effect at the 11
th
 
period of the game as will be shown later. This is in line with the declining cooperation 
over time usually found in public good experiments and could be compared with the 
differences observed between stranger and partner-matching protocols (see Keser and van 
Winden, 2000). Figure 3 displays the average return to output level, i.e. the average output 
achieved divided by the average cost level. On average, managers achieve a lower level of 
efficiency than students. The former perform a greater output but at a higher cost. In part 2, 
the average level of efficiency rises slightly in both subject pools. 
However, overall statistics are uncontrolled for time, difficulty of the curves and individual 
effects. Regression analyses controlling for these dimensions are thus required to identify 
the determinants of two endogenous variables: output levels and costs. In Table 2, we 
present the definition and descriptive statistics of variables used in these regressions.  
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[Insert Table2 about here] 
Exogenous variables are the period, the category of subjects, the mode of compensation, the 
composition of groups and an index of difficulty for each curve. The “lagged output 
achieved of the other group members” variable assesses whether subjects modulate their 
outputs to what their teammates did in the previous period. Interaction variables involving 
the Y subjects are created to test whether X and Y subjects behave differently. Coefficient 
estimates of the variable “mode of compensation in part 1” report the decisions of the X 
subjects in part 1 relative to their decisions under the mode of compensation in part 2 
(element of the constant term). With the coefficients of the “mixed session” variable, we 
further distinguish the decisions of the X subjects in the mixed sessions of part 2 relative to 
the fixed sessions of part 2. The decisions of the Y subjects in part 1 are the sum of the 
coefficients of the variables “Y subject”, “mode of compensation in part 1” and “Y subject 
and mode of compensation in part 1”. This last variable is needed as the modes of 
compensation differ in part 1 between X and Y subjects. Summing-up, coefficient estimates 
of variables “Y subject”, “mixed session” and “Y subject and mixed session” give the 
decisions of Y subjects in the mixed sessions in part 2. The coefficient of the “Y subject” 
variable shows the decisions of “Y subjects” in the fixed sessions in part 2.  
The index of difficulty and the period variables enter regressions with interacting variables 
and nonlinear forms. Instead of including a dummy for each period to control for time 
effects, we distinguish the variable “logarithm of the period” from the “periods 1 to 20” 
variable in order to separate two potentially adverse effects. While the former may account 
for elements such as boredom that could push output level down over time, the latter may 
account for learning of the task that could increase output over time. Lastly, demographic 
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variables such as gender and age were entered to control for their potential impact but since 
none proved to be significant, they were subsequently removed. 
4.2 Econometric results 
Column 1 of Tables 3 and 3a display the results for the students and managers, 
respectively, on the subjects’ output achieved. Column 2 of both tables report the results on 
the determinants of cost levels. The cost incurred corresponds to the number of occasion 
the 2-steps button was used to perform the task. All econometric estimates are obtained 
with a linear one-way random effects model.
ix
[Insert Tables 3 and 3a about here] 
For the students considered as a benchmark, few variables significantly influence outputs, 
except periods and the difficulty of the task. In contrast, the cost levels are influenced by 
more elements. A change in monetary incentives in the second part of the experiment 
makes students react by increasing their cost levels but not their output. An increase in the 
output levels of their teammates during the preceding period incites them to increase their 
costs, particularly for the X subjects. Lastly, costs decline over time and the relationship 
between the difficulty of the curves and the costs indicates a reverse U-shape. 
In contrast, we observe for managers a significant and substantial increase in outputs by 
both X and Y subjects in part 2 relative to part 1. The change in incentives after the merger 
increases outputs by almost 12 points. The change in the composition of teams exerts no 
significant influence on output. Note however the negative but statistically insignificant 
coefficient of the interaction variable “Y subject and Mixed”: Y subjects, knowing that they 
may be interacting with X subjects, have a tendency to lower their output levels. Despite 
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the stranger-matching protocol, Y subjects are also influenced by the behavior of their 
teammates in the preceding period: an increase in teammate outputs motivates subjects to 
increase their own output. It should also be noted that, if we observe a negative first period 
effect on output achieved, there is no restart effect at the 11
th
 period. The difficulty of the 
curves and the number of periods affect outputs in a nonlinear way. 
The change in composition of the teams in part 2 has no significant impact on effort 
decisions, however, it exerts a determinant impact on the cost levels chosen by the subjects. 
Ceteris paribus, X subjects increase their costs in a mixed session by 6.23 units relative to a 
fixed session, while Y subjects substantially reduce theirs by 8.38 units when they know 
they may be teamed with X subjects. 
x
 The relationship between the difficulty of the curves 
and the costs indicates a reverse U-shape as with the students. Lastly, there is a positive 
first period effect on cost levels, but costs decline more linearly as the experiment evolves. 
4.3 Discussion 
This section will focus on the reactions to the shifts in incentives, in team composition and 
in the difficulty of the task. Our results provide clear evidence of differences in reactions to 
a change in monetary incentives between the subject-pools. The new compensation scheme 
in the second part does increase the output levels of X and Y managers. In contrast, the 
same monetary incentives, controlling for other variables, incite students to increase not 
their outputs but their costs to accomplish the different tasks imposed on them. Among 
managers, Y participants substantially decrease their costs in part 2. Another difference is 
the reaction to lagged output levels of the other group members. Y managers increase their 
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outputs if the output levels of their previous teammates increase. Student participants 
modify their cost levels to the previous output levels of their group members. 
These results show that the change in incentives influences both subject-pools, with 
managers appearing to be objective driven while students are cost driven. This is not that 
surprising as managers in their professional life are evaluated, remunerated and promoted 
by meeting their objectives whatever the cost they must incur to do so (long working hours 
for example). For most students, a large part of the return of their academic effort is from 
lowering their cost (time devoted to studying a specific matter) in order to obtain good 
grades. Note that we were able to observe this kind of results because we used a real costly 
task. If the student-subjects appear to be more money maximizing than managers in the 
laboratory, this cannot be attributed to the differences in the opportunity costs to 
participate, since this was taken into account in the conversion rates. 
The changing composition of teams also influences the behavior of subjects. Within the 
same category (X or Y), most subjects are influenced by the behavior of their preceding 
teammates although teams are reshuffled each period. This might suggest that the subjects 
refer to their category as a whole. However, the linear one-way effects models recognized 
that subjects are heterogeneous; our results suggest that subject-pools and categories are 
also heterogeneous. Both X and Y student-subjects are influenced by the output of the 
subjects they were previously teamed with but they are not influenced by the merging 
between categories in the second part of the experiment; thus, they do not refer to a specific 
category but to the whole set of subjects. By contrast, after the merger, the decisions of the 
category of managers who are more sensitive to the outputs of previous teammates (the Y 
managers) change behavior knowing that they may be interacting with subjects from the 
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other category; they become less cooperative and they substantially reduce their costs and 
to a lesser degree their outputs. On the contrary, X managers who are not influenced by the 
behavior of previous teammates react positively to the merging of the categories in the 
same teams. Groups of reference are not the same across subject-pools. 
In traditional experimental economics literature, reaction to others’ decision is usually 
characterized by a reciprocity concept (see Fehr and Falk, 2002). Since our experiment is 
run with randomly re-matched subjects at each period, this can also be explained by 
learning and conditional cooperation: subjects learn the behavior of other subjects in the 
same category or in the same room and constantly update their beliefs. But more puzzling is 
the reaction to the mixing of categories after the merger. Three explanations could be 
evoked. A first explanation might be that the merger changes preferences by introducing 
new incentives. This explanation cannot help since we measure the impact of a shift in team 
composition other things equal, i.e. we control for changes in incentives. The psychological 
concept of “in-group/out-group” (Tajfel, Flament, Billig and Bundy, 1971) might affect the 
cooperative behavior of participants. This explanation cannot directly help here since 
students and managers do not react in the same way. If managers were able to transfer their 
experience of the merger into the laboratory whereas the students were not able to do so, 
this psychological effect might play a role for the managers. But it does not explain why X 
and Y managers did not react similarly. A more convincing explanation refers to a sorting 
effect of incentives as documented by Lazear (2000). The incoming companies that merged 
might differ in recruiting different profiles of managers, then developing different cultures, 
because of their various incentive schemes. The pre-existence of an individual bonus may 
contribute to focusing on one’s own performance instead on the other’s output. 
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The reaction to the difficulty of the task is similar for managers and students. The U-shape 
curve suggests that more difficult tasks may actually elicit, to some extent, more output. 
This job challenge effect is present even in the later stages of the experiment (see the 
“index of difficulty and period” crossed variable), whereas the logarithm of period exerts a 
negative effect on the output level (that could be interpreted as boredom or tiredness). This 
result is consistent with the psychological literature showing that challenging goals lead to 
higher performance than easy goals (Locke, Saari, Shaw and Latham, 1981). The job 
challenge may even be at the initiative of the subject herself (for example if she uses targets 
like reaching the second peak). The relationship between the difficulty of the curves and the 
costs supported by all participants indicates a reverse U-shape. If the task is too difficult, 
subjects increase their outputs but without resorting to costly 2-step moves. This result 
reinforces our preceding analysis: an increased difficulty does not discourage output under 
the condition that subjects can save on their costs. Lastly, there is a positive first period 
effect on the cost levels (significant for the managers), but costs decline more linearly as 
the experiment evolves. This is possibly due to a learning effect on the task, on the other’s 
behavior, and on the best moment to use the costly moves. Students appear to learn more 
than managers as they play the game since they not only decrease their costs but also 
increase their outputs (see variable “Periods 1 to 20”).
xi
5. Summary and conclusion 
Executive behavior with respect to performance, motivation and cooperation is a major 
element in the success or failure of a merger between companies. Traditionally, economists 
have suggested looking for an adapted compensation policy to facilitate cooperation within 
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groups of individuals coming from different corporate cultures. The aim of this paper is to 
check whether a harmonization of compensation packages is sufficient to motivate all 
managers to cooperate to the same extent. A laboratory experiment has been run involving 
managers of two large pharmaceutical companies that recently went through a merger. The 
experimental design has introduced various compensation schemes, including an incentive 
scheme combining individual and team incentives that were implemented in the context of 
a real task. As in most mergers, these manager-subjects have experienced the redesigning 
of both compensation schemes and team composition in their newly merged company. The 
protocol reproduced the pre- and post-merger situation in terms of both compensation and 
team composition. To complement this experiment, a replication with a subject pool 
consisting of French and Canadian students was conducted that can serve as a benchmark.  
The results show that financial incentives do work in improving output achieved, in 
accordance with standard results (Prendergast, 1999). However, the unified incentives are 
not entirely sufficient to create cooperation among heterogeneous groups, as already 
experimentally observed (Meidinger, Rulliere and Villeval, 2003). Past matters. In contrast 
with Nalbantian and Schotter (1997), it matters more in terms of shifting team composition 
than in terms of incentives, since the change from the two pre-merger incentive schemes to 
the unified one increases output in the same proportion. Individuals coming from different 
corporate cultures, likely with different fairness norms and social comparison behavior, 
tend to react differently in the mixed treatment part of our experiment. This may result 
notably from a sorting effect, attributable to various selection policies in the originating 
firms: companies with different incentive policies probably attract different types of 
managers. This suggests that shifting team composition may limit, at least in the short run, 
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the efficiency of a new unified compensation policy, if not taken into account. Merging 
cultures requires more time than merging incentives and deserves special attention. Our 
experiment also shows that introducing complex tasks is not necessarily detrimental to 
performance and cooperation. The concept of job challenge is perhaps more important to 
soliciting greater effort among employees than is usually suggested in current literature. 
Results from the student-subject pool differ in strategy more than in substance, allowing 
confirmation of the external validity of laboratory experiments. In contrast to the managers, 
students react to an increase in monetary incentives by accepting more costs to complete a 
given task rather than increasing their output levels. They are cost driven whereas managers 
appear to be objective-driven. This means that the managers are also more cooperative and 
free ride less than the student-subjects. Our results corroborate the interpretation of Cooper 
et al. (1999) in that when they are able to recognize the similarity between the laboratory 
context and their field experience, manager-subjects may choose different strategic options 
than inexperienced subjects. Moreover, it may indicate that if students are more inclined to 
minimize costs than experts in the laboratory, when one observes the existence of other-
regarding preferences in traditional experiments involving student-subjects, one may 
deduce that this deviation from the equilibrium is likely more developed in real settings.  
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Figure 3. Average return to output by subject pool and by treatment 
Note: The average indices of difficulty of the curves are the following: In the student-sessions, periods 1 to 
10: 22 949; periods 11-20 in the mixed treatment: 24 047; periods 11-20 in the fixed sessions: 21 635. In the 
manager-sessions, periods 1 to 10: 22 949; periods 11-20 in the mixed treatment: 22 339; periods 11-20 in the 
fixed sessions: 21 635. 
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Table 1-- Payment schemes in ECU 
 Part 1 – All treatments Part 2 – Fixed treatment Part 2 – Mixed treatment 
Group 
Composition 
Teams of X 
subjects 
Teams of Y 
subjects 
Teams of X 
subjects 
Teams of Y 
subjects 
Teams of X and Y 
subjects 
Height reached      
40iH <  
40 60iH≤ <  
60 100iH≤ ≤
 
3
1
240iH ≥∑  
0 
40 
60 
100 
0 
60 
60 
 
100 
0 
60 
80 
 
120 
0 
60 
80 
 
120 
0 
60 
80 
 
120 
Note: For the teams of X subjects the table should be read as follows. In the first part of the experiment, if a X 
subject realizes an outcome lower than the first threshold of 40, he receives no payoff. If he reaches a height 
between the first (40) and the second threshold (60), he receives only a fixed wage of 40 ( ). If the subject 
reaches the second threshold, he receives a payoff of 60, consisting of the sum of the fixed wage and the 
individual bonus ( ). If the subject’s team reaches a cumulated height of 240, the subject receives a 
payoff of 100, corresponding to the sum of the fixed wage, the individual bonus and the team reward 
( ). Part 2 and the teams of Y subjects should be interpreted in a similar manner. 
XF
XF I+ X
XX XF I T+ +
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 Table 2--Variables and descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition  
Mean  
(Standard deviation) 
 
Endogenous variables  Managers Students 
Output achieved  Output levels  reached by the subjects 78.04 
(20.96) 
73.9 
(20.680) 
Cost  
 
Costs of outputs  supported by the subjects  16.60 
(13.19) 
12.75 
(11.39) 
Exogenous Variables    
1st period effect 
 
 1 if the 1st period; 
 0 otherwise 
0.05 
0.95 
0.05 
0.95 
11th period effect 
 
 1 if the 11th period ; 
 0 otherwise 
0.05 
0.95 
0.05 
0.95 
Y subject   1 if the individual is a Y subject; 
 0 otherwise (X subject) 
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
Mixed session 
 
 1 if X and Y subjects can interact; 
 0 otherwise 
0.33 
0.67 
0.33 
0.67 
Mixed session and 
Y subject 
 1 if Y is involved in a mixed session; 
 0 otherwise 
0.16 
0.84 
0.16 
0.84 
Mode of compensation in 
part 1 
 1 if part 1 (periods 1 to 10); 
 0 if part 2 (periods 11 to 20) 
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
Mode of compensation in 
part 1 and Y subject 
 1 if a Y subject in part 1; 
 0 otherwise  
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
Lagged output levels of the 
other members of the group 
Output of the other members of the group in the 
preceding period 
154.88* 
(32.07) 
146.49* 
(34.67) 
Lagged output levels of the 
other members of the group 
and Y 
Output of the other members of the group in the 
preceding period and Y 
155.15** 
(32.37) 
147.58** 
(35.04) 
Index of difficulty  Index of difficulty of the curve/100 225.27 
(143.10) 
230.96 
(143.36) 
Index of difficulty squared Index of difficulty squared 71798.18 
(72847.8) 
73882.02 
(72.466.04) 
Index of difficulty and 
period 
Interaction of index of difficulty and period 2498.6 
(2482.7) 
2581.17 
(2512.12) 
Period Period number from 1 to 20 10.5 10.5 
Logarithm of period Logarithm of period 2.12 2.12 
* 1st and 11th periods excluded. ** For Y subjects only and 1st and 11th periods excluded. 
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Table 3--Students: determinants of output levels and costs 
 
Variable  Output 
Panel Random* Cost Panel Random** 
 Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant 135.9a 26.5        11.3a 4.21 
1st period - 43.09a -10.9        0.671 0.362 
11th period     -4.858   -1.46        0.387  0.303 
Y subject      3.045    0.858         -1.9608 -0.831 
Mixed     -0.7015    -0.324         -1.322 -1.24 
Y and Mixed     1.908     0.625          1.912          1.27 
Mode of compensation in 
part 1 
  -2.740   -1.02        -5.27a   -4.10 
Y and mode of compensation 
in part 1 
    2.896    1.14        1.410 1.14 
Output levels of other group 
members 
-0.01724    -1.17         0.02892a  4.18 
Y and output levels of  other 
group members 
 -0.01738    -1.23       -0.01186b  -1.79 
Index of difficulty  -0.3076a       -24.2       0.03958a  6.63 
Index of difficulty squared 0.0004981a     21.6   -0.00003859a -3.57 
Index of difficulty and period 0.001846a    2.73     0.0007233a  2.28 
Periods 1 to 20   1.0409a   2.50     -0.6201a -3.17 
Logarithm of period   -18.20a -7.35       0.4660  0.968 
Adjusted R2 0.3569 0.163 
Number of observations 1440 1440 
* Linear one-way random effects model. Lagrange multiplier test versus OLS = 433.71 
(1 df, prob value = 0.00000).** Linear one-way random effects model. Lagrange multiplier test 
versus OLS = 2761.10 
(1 df, prob value = .000000) 
a) significant at 5% level;  b)  significant at 10% level. 
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Table 3a--Managers: determinants of output levels and costs 
Variable  Output 
Panel Random* Cost Panel Random** 
 Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant 125.32a 13.3          6.197 1.13 
1st period - 11.80 -1.59          10.25a 2.42 
11th period      -1.539    -0.289            0.967   0.318 
Y subject       -3.030    -0.526            8.06a 2.16 
Mixed     1.500      0.414            6.23a 2.83 
Y and Mixed     -7.194   -1.41         -14.61a        -4.69 
Mode of compensation in 
part 1 
   -11.791a    -2.47        -1.805  -0.653 
Y and mode of compensation 
in part 1 
    -4.559   -1.04        -10.09a -3.88 
Lagged output levels of other 
group members 
0.03469     1.251          0.02427  1.53 
Y and output levels of  other 
group members 
  0.05420a    2.33        0.0195  1.37 
Index of difficulty  -0.2132a        -9.41       0.05503a  4.27 
Index of difficulty squared 0.0003381a    8.37   -0.00007559a -3.29 
Index of difficulty and period 0.003394a    2.82      0.001122b  1.64 
Periods 1 to 20   -1.354b  -1.83     -1.037a -2.47 
Logarithm of period   -7.768b -1.76       2.799  1.11 
Adjusted R2 0.1562 0.1792 
Number of observations 720 720 
* Linear one-way random effects model. Lagrange multiplier test versus OLS = 12.06 
(1 df, prob value = .000515). 
** Linear one-way random effects model. Lagrange multiplier test versus OLS = 114.41 
(1 df, prob value = .000000). 
a) significant at 5% level;  b)  significant at 10% level. 
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Notes 
i
 The experiment was computerized using the REGATE program. All curves used in this 
experiment and the instructions can be found at the following web site: 
http://platypus.gate.ec-lyon.fr/groupware/g_gate/Raventis.htm.  
ii
 Once the curve is known, it is possible to find the best strategy to reach the highest peak 
at the lowest cost. A referee’s suggestion to compare the subject’s behavior with this 
optimal strategy appears worthwhile to pursue to study the learning process and the 
cognitive effort of the participants. 
iii
  The negative impact on efficiency of the increasing size of teams in a merger has been 
documented by Camerer and Knez (1994). 
iv  It would have been interesting to test whether belonging to the majority category or the 
minority category of a team would influence individual behavior within teams. However, 
this would have required collecting a far greater number of observations. For this reason we 
did not inform subjects about the detailed composition of their teams. 
v Overall, participants came from 4 different sites and 22 departments. 
vi Reading instructions aloud guarantees that rules are common knowledge. However the 
section of instructions related to different payment schemes of the X and Y subjects must 
remain unknown until the end of the first part of the session. Reading aloud only other 
sections of the instructions would have focused undue attention on the question of 
compensation. 
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itE
i
vii This is evocative of the result found by Charness, Frechette, and Kagel (2001) that in a 
gift-exchange game, there is less reciprocity when the payoffs for different actions are 
made clearer. 
viii The observation that managers free-ride less than students is reminiscent of the Hannan 
et al. (2002) result that MBA students (which are more like managers) do more gift-
exchange than other students. 
ix Let  measure individual i’s output level in period t, explained by a vector of observable 
variables zit, the corresponding parameter vector δ, a random individual component η  and 
a random variable itε :  with the usual 
assumptions, 
TtnizE iititit ,,1,,,1, …… ==++= ηεδ( ) ( ) .0,,0~,1,0~ 2 =εησσηε NN itit  
x
 From the calculation: [8.06 – (8.06 + 6.23 – 14.61)]. The first term is the coefficient of the 
variable for Y participants in part 2 when groups are fixed. The second term represents the 
value of the coefficients for Y participants in part 2 when groups are mixed. 
xi
 Despite their different strategies, the similarity of students’ and managers’ average net 
payoffs is striking. However, with more output achieved by the managers, the average 
surplus of a hypothetical firm (height times a constant minus wage costs) is higher when 
employing managers-subjects rather than students-subjects. The net payoffs are higher 
under the Y payment scheme than under the X payment scheme before the merger. After 
the merger, net payoffs are higher when teams, whether composed of students or managers, 
are homogeneous. In contrast, the hypothetical firm’s performance is greater under the X 
payment scheme before the merger and with mixed teams after the merger. 
